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Observational learning is probably one of the most powerful factors determining
progress during child development. When learning a new skill, infants rely on their
own exploration; but they also frequently benefit from an adult’s verbal support or
from demonstration by an adult modeling the action. At what age and under what
conditions does adult demonstration really help the infant to learn a novel behavior?
In this review, we summarize recently published work we have conducted on the
acquisition of tool use during the second year of life. In particular, we consider under
what conditions and to what extent seeing a demonstration from an adult advances an
infant’s understanding of how to use a tool to obtain an out-of-reach object. Our results
show that classic demonstration starts being helpful at 18 months of age. When adults
explicitly show their intention prior to demonstration, even 16-month-old infants learn
from the demonstration. On the other hand, providing an explicit demonstration (“look at
how I do it”) is not very useful before infants are ready to succeed by themselves anyway.
In contrast, repeated observations of the required action in a social context, without
explicit reference to this action, considerably advances the age of success and the
usefulness of providing a demonstration. We also show that the effect of demonstration
can be enhanced if the demonstration makes the baby laugh. Taken together, the results
from this series of studies on observational learning of tool use in infants suggest,
first, that when observing a demonstration, infants do not know what to pay attention
to: demonstration must be accompanied by rich social cues to be effective; second,
infants’ attention is inhibited rather than enhanced by an explicit demand of “look at
what I do”; and finally a humorous situation considerably helps infants understand the
demonstration.
Keywords: observational learning, demonstration, tool use, social cues, infants
INTRODUCTION
Infants are avid explorers of the environment: their intrinsic motivation drives them to constantly
look for new experiences which, in turn, increases their knowledge of the environment and
allows them ultimately to display typically human behaviors such as tool use. In particular,
it has been hypothesized that the “origins of tool use in humans can be found [. . .] in the
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perception-action routines that infants repeatedly display as
they explore their environments.” (Lockman, 2000, p. 137). But
whereas such a mechanism of discovery is undoubtedly an
important factor in development, another, more economical,
but less studied mechanism also exists, namely observational
learning.
Observational learning can be defined as the process whereby
an adult or a child “attempts to imitate another person executing
a new motor skill” (Hayes et al., 2008, p. 407). Imitation is
a rapid and efficient means to learn a new skill, allowing the
learner to avoid painstaking trial-and-error learning. Whereas
some imitation can be observed from birth, for instance for
mouth opening, and whereas as early as 6 months infants can
repeat the manual action an adult makes in front of him, such
as squeezing a duck (Abravanel et al., 1976), true observational
learning appears much later, not before the second year (Meltzoff,
1988; Elsner and Aschersleben, 2003; Elsner et al., 2007; Esseily
et al., 2010).
In this paper, after a short reminder of what is known about
observational learning during early development, the conditions
leading to successful imitation, and after briefly presenting
the tool-use problem and the spontaneous behavior of 12–
22 month-old infants confronted with this problem, we will
review studies we have been performing in our laboratory
which investigate possible reasons for the late appearance of
observational learning in our tool-use task. One issue we
will consider is whether it is possible to advance the age of
observational learning and in which conditions of context and of
demonstration.
OBSERVATIONAL LEARNING
As said above, observational learning is a special case of imitation,
in which the action to be imitated is not part of the child’s
existing repertoire of actions or which is failed without prior
demonstration. Thus, whereas imitation of simple actions can be
observed as early as 6 months of age (for reviews see Poulson
et al., 1989; Elsner, 2007; Elsner et al., 2007), this cannot be
considered to be observational learning, because these simple
actions are already in the infant’s motor repertoire. Observational
learning of a new skill has been less studied, at least in infants
and toddlers (see Ashford et al., 2007’s meta-analysis for children
and adult studies). In one study it was shown that at 12 months,
infants can learn by observation how to bimanually manipulate a
rolling drum to produce music (Fagard and Lockman, 2009). At
14–15 months they can learn by observation to push a button to
produce music (Meltzoff, 1988; Elsner and Aschersleben, 2003).
In the latter study they are surprised if the effect they produce
is not similar to that produced by the adult. In another study it
appeared that at 15 months, children can learn by observation
how to turn a bottle upside down to retrieve a small peg inserted
in it (Esseily et al., 2010).
Observational learning seems to occur later for tool use. For
instance, Chen and Siegler (2000) showed that even well after
18 months, infants may still be unable to learn how to use a tool
through observation. Between 18 and 35 months, some infants
used the tool appropriately to retrieve a toy after observation,
but others still used indirect strategies such as trying to reach
with their hands, asking for their mother’s help or simply staring
at the toy without trying to reach for it. In the pilot testing of
their Nagell et al. (1993) study, also noticed that the three 18-
month-olds they observed were unable to use a rake to get a
toy out of a cage after demonstration from the experimenter.
In contrast, in the 1993 study itself, some 2-year-olds showed
occasional successes, more so in the groups which had been
shown the action first (2 12 successes out of 10) than in the no-
model group (less than 1/10 success). Thus, learning a complex
multiple-step skill by observing an adult is difficult before the
end of the second year of life. Before considering tool use as
part of the larger category of two-step or “means-end” actions
acquired during early childhood, we will briefly review the studies
in which manipulating the modeling conditions impacted on
infants’ success in reproducing the modeled action.
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE
REPRODUCTION OF MODELED
ACTIONS IN YOUNG CHILDREN
Many studies have been devoted to understanding how infants
and young children reproduce the action modeled by an adult.
It has been traditionally said that, as opposed to non-human
primates, young infants tend to imitate not only the goal of the
demonstrated action (emulation) but also the means used by the
model to reach this goal (Nagell et al., 1993), sometimes even
over-imitating irrelevant means (Whiten et al., 2009; McGuigan
and Robertson, 2015). A growing body of research has tried to
understand the factors leading infants to either imitate the means
or else to only emulate the goal.
These studies have revealed several factors. Young children
predominantly imitate the means when the set-up makes the goal
of the action less clear (e.g., reaching toward the table without (vs.
with) a dot marking the point of reaching, (Bekkering et al., 2000;
see also Carpenter et al., 2002, 2005; Williamson and Markman,
2006). On the other hand, infants tend to emulate the goal
when the model shows an irrational means (e.g., pushing a toy
through a tube using a stick toward the free end as opposed to
toward the dead-end, Want and Harris, 2001); when the model
uses a means for a clear reason but that is not applicable to
themselves (e.g., switching on a light with the head, with the
model’s hands being occupied, Meltzoff, 1988; Gergely et al., 2002;
Zmyj et al., 2009); when the means used successfully by the model
seems accidental (“Whoops”) rather than intentional (“There”)
(Carpenter et al., 1998); when the information available from the
model is degraded (e.g., obtaining a reward from a box following
a video rather than a live model, McGuigan et al., 2007). In
addition, young children are more successful in their imitation
when the demonstration comes after the intention of the model
is shown (Carpenter et al., 2002; Southgate et al., 2009).
The above studies, many of them involving children older than
2 years, show the importance of taking into account different
factors that can influence the child’s reproduction of an action
modeled by an adult. However, in contrast with our task, many of
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the actions to be repeated by the child were simple and probably
familiar to the child (with a few exceptions: Carpenter et al., 1998;
Want and Harris, 2001; McGuigan et al., 2007). In our original
study, the task was difficult and infants did not spontaneously
succeed at retrieving an out-of-reach toy with a rake placed
within reach but not next to the toy. We thought that the goal of
the action was clear to the infant since the demonstration always
took place after the infant had tried unsuccessfully to retrieve the
toy (we later questioned this assumption, as we will see further).
The means used by the model was always direct (the model
grasped the rake and raked the toy toward himself or herself).
Finally, in our task there was no other way to succeed than the
one shown by the adult. Before discussing the factors that could
explain why infants failed to copy the demonstration in our task
before 18 months of age, we will briefly review what is known
about the development of means-end actions of which tool use is
a special example.
FROM MEANS-END TO TOOL USE
A means-end task is a task in which the goal of the action cannot
be manually reached directly by the actor, who has to perform
intermediate actions or “means” (Piaget, 1936). One of the earliest
cases when infants are confronted with the impossibility of
directly grasping an interesting object is when the interesting part
of the object is at the end of a handle, too far away to be grasped
directly (e.g., a rattle). For instance we observed that when a
bright ball is at the end of an uninteresting rigid handle, 6-month-
old infants point toward the ball while ignoring the handle. In
contrast, most 8-month- and 10-month-old infants immediately
grasp the handle while looking at the ball (Fagard et al., 2015).
When the uninteresting part is not rigid, so that the composite
object looks like two objects rather than a single one, for instance
a toy at the end of a string or placed on a cloth, it takes a few more
weeks for the child to understand that she or he can pull the string
or the cloth to retrieve the object of interest (Piaget, 1936; Fagard,
1998; Willatts, 1999; Buttelmann et al., 2008).
Bates et al. (1980) compared 9–10-month-old infants
retrieving an out-of-reach toy placed either on a cloth, at the end
of a string, or at different positions near three kinds of utensils
likely to help the children retrieve it (hoop, crook, or stick). The
children succeeded in conditions where toy and means to retrieve
it were physically linked (“unbreakable contact,” cf. means-end
situations just mentioned) but less often when the contact was
breakable, and not at all in the condition with no contact. The
authors concluded that at 10 months, solving the problem is
easier when the spatial arrangement suggests a link between the
means to retrieve it and the toy.
A generally accepted definition of tool use is the ability to
use one object to extend the limit of our physical body in order
to act upon another spatially independent object (Beck, 1980).
Infants’ first successful use of such a real tool is likely to be with
a spoon, starting around the age of 1 year. This skill progresses
considerably during the second year (Connolly and Dalgleish,
1989). Note that the case of the spoon is particular, in the sense
that prior to using the spoon themselves, infants have many
opportunities to see their family and other people use a spoon
to eat.
Using unfamiliar tools to bring an out-of-reach object within
reach is succeeded later. A few studies have focused on how
infants learn to use such a new tool (see Greif and Needham,
2011 and Keen, 2011, for reviews). Most of them have focused
on perceptual factors, all stressing that difficulty increases with
the size of the spatial gap between the tool and the object to be
acted upon (Bates et al., 1980; van Leeuwen et al., 1994), and more
generally with the number of steps needed to achieve the required
result (Smitsman and Cox, 2008). In these studies, emphasis was
put either on the sensorimotor progress leading to skillful tool
use (Connolly and Dalgleish, 1989), on the perceptual constraints
which make using a tool a real cognitive problem for the infant
(Bates et al., 1980; van Leeuwen et al., 1994; Smitsman and Cox,
2008), or on the role of familiarity or novelty in the capacity to
use a tool or to transfer and generalize knowledge to new tools
(Brown, 1990; Barrett et al., 2007). In other words, most of these
early studies were concerned more with cataloging the factors
inducing success than with understanding the actual mechanisms
underlying tool-use learning, in particular trial and error and
observational learning.
In the following section we recall data from a series of recently
published studies on the emergence of tool use (Rat-Fischer et al.,
2012; Fagard et al., 2014), in which we investigated to what extent
trial and error and observational learning respectively allow
infants to learn how to use a tool. Here we aim at summarizing
the parts that concern observational learning. Thus, we will only
briefly recall the methodology, referring the reader to the original
articles for further details.
USING A TOOL TO BRING A FAR-AWAY
TOY INTO REACH
Our paradigm consisted of presenting infants with a desirable
out-of-reach toy, and with a T-shaped rake-like tool, long enough
to retrieve the toy. The “rake” was within reach and constructed
out of white cardboard with a 20-cm-long handle (Fagard et al.,
2014). The toys were small, bright, and salient whereas the rake
was white and intentionally unobtrusive so that infants would
be attracted to the out-of-reach toy more than to the rake. We
investigated several spatial arrangements of toy and rake (toy
inside/against the rake, toy inside the rake but not against, toy
to the side of the rake). We followed five infants from 12 to
20 months in a longitudinal study (Fagard et al., 2014) and 60
infants aged 14, 16, 18, 20, 22 months, in a cross-sectional study
(Rat-Fischer et al., 2012). Here only the condition “toy to the side
of the rake” will be considered (see Figure 1) since it was only
in this condition that we investigated the effect of demonstration
in further experiments. For more details, see Rat-Fischer et al.
(2012) and Fagard et al. (2014).
In the longitudinal study, all infants younger than 16 months
failed to retrieve the toy, except for one isolated success that
the infant could not repeat. There was a sudden increase of
spontaneous success between age 17 months and age 18 months.
At around 18 months, all five infants succeeded at least at some
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FIGURE 1 | Typical spontaneous behavior of a 16-month-old when an out-of-reach toy is presented to the side of a rake (spatial gap): the child
grasps the rake, discards it, and begs for the toy.
trials. In the cross-sectional study, where each child had only one
session, there was 0% spontaneous success at 14 and 16 months,
and the percentage slowly increased to reach 10% at 18 months
and about 30% at 22 months.
Thus, spontaneous success at tool use when the tool and
the out-of-reach object are spatially separated developed slowly
during the second year, though faster in the longitudinal study
when the infants were given the test every month from their
first birthday. These results were not surprising in light of
earlier studies showing that a spatial gap between tool and
object renders the task extremely difficult for children less than
2 years (Bates et al., 1980; Brown, 1990; van Leeuwen et al.,
1994). What we expected less is that demonstration by an adult
did not increase the rate of success before 18 months, as we
will see in the next section. Since observational learning of
means-end has been shown possible as of 12 months of age
(Meltzoff, 1988; Elsner and Aschersleben, 2003; Elsner et al.,
2007), and since infants are able to use a spoon at about
the same age (Connolly and Dalgleish, 1989), we expected the
demonstration in our situation to be useful before 18 months
of age.
CLASSIC DEMONSTRATION OF A
TOOL-USE ACTION
In both the longitudinal and the cross-sectional studies, each time
infants failed to retrieve the toy, an adult (the experimenter or the
parent) gave two consecutive demonstrations, from the infant’s
point of view (i.e., the experimenter or parent moved the rake and
toy toward the child, see Figure 2). Then the infants were tested
again.
In the longitudinal study, none of the infants succeeded in
retrieving the toy with the rake immediately after demonstration
before the age of 18 months.
To check whether the demonstration had some effect even
though infants were not actually able to retrieve the toy, we
defined a performance score between 0 and 4 as follows. 0: no
interest neither in the toy nor in the rake; 1: mostly interested
in the out-of-reach toy, pointing toward it and trying to retrieve
it without using the rake; 2: mainly interested in manipulating
FIGURE 2 | Classic demonstration.
the rake; 3: repeatedly bringing the rake to bear on the toy but
seemingly not with the purpose of retrieving the toy; 4: successful
or near successful retrieval of the toy with the rake. There was
no difference in score before versus after demonstration during
the first five sessions (up to age 17 months). Only at the sixth
session (age 18 months) did the statistics show that infants scored
significantly higher after the demonstration (see Figure 3). We
found similar results in the cross-sectional study (Rat-Fischer
et al., 2012). Thus infants started to benefit from demonstration
quite late, not before 18 months.
The relatively late effect of demonstration is consistent with
other work showing that proper understanding of the causal
structure of means-end tasks in observational learning only
matures in the second half of the second year (Meltzoff, 1995;
Bellagamba and Tomasello, 1999; Huang et al., 2002). However,
our observation of the absence of an effect of demonstration
before 18 months contrasts with the studies mentioned above
showing that infants can learn to solve a means-end task from
observation of a demonstration by an adult from the beginning
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FIGURE 3 | Compared score before and after a classic demonstration
(longitudinal study).
of their second year of life (Provasi et al., 2001; Elsner et al.,
2007; Esseily et al., 2010). This led us to investigate the reasons
why repeated demonstrations were not effective in our studies, in
other words, what are the factors that could explain why infants
failed to copy the demonstration in our task? The first possibility
we investigated was that infants were not able to interpret
the demonstration because they did not sufficiently understand
the intention of the demonstrator. To test this possibility, we
provided the infant with cues about the demonstrator’s intention
prior to demonstration.
SHOWING THE OBSERVER’S INTENTION
PRIOR TO DEMONSTRATION
In this study (Esseily et al., 2013), we tested 70 16-month-
old infants for tool use. The toy consisted of a small car
which could be rolled along the table. We used the same rake
as for the longitudinal and cross-sectional studies described
above, and presented infants with a condition with a spatial
gap between rake and toy. We chose age 16 months because
we knew from the two previous studies that at this age infants
could not spontaneously succeed at this task when the toy is
not contiguous with the rake. We nevertheless used a control
group with no demonstration (spontaneous group), which we
could compare with two demonstration groups and two other
control groups (N = 14 in each group). For the demonstration
groups, the experimenter sat perpendicular to the infant and
received the car from another person seated in front of the
child. The experimenter played with the car for a few seconds,
and then rolled it along the table in front of her so that it
ended up out of reach, but within reach of the rake. Then,
depending on the group it belonged to, each infant either received
a classic demonstration (the experimenter simply grasped the
rake and used it to retrieve the car), or the infant was shown
the intention of the experimenter before demonstration. To do
this, once the toy was out of reach, the experimenter stretched
her arm and hand toward the car, obviously trying to grasp it
and said, “I can’t get it” (see Figure 4). She then used the tool
to retrieve the car. In both conditions the same scenario was
repeated twice (for more details about the protocol, see Esseily
FIGURE 4 | Showing the intention prior to demonstration.
et al., 2013). After demonstration, infants received the same
test as was given directly at the beginning of the session to the
infants of the spontaneous group. To make sure that a difference
between the classic and the prior intention demonstrations
could not be due to the fact that the attention of the infant
was enhanced on the car, rather than to understanding of
the experimenter’s intention, we added another control group
(Stimulus enhancement condition). In this condition, once the
car had been rolled out of reach by the experimenter, the
person seated across from the infant made the car move by
itself for a few seconds by manipulating a magnet under the
table. The experimenter then performed the demonstration as
in the Classic demonstration condition, followed by the test.
And to make sure that a difference between the classic and
the prior intention demonstration could not be due to more
“motor resonance” (Paulus et al., 2011) when the experimenter
showed her intention (since here the arm movement toward the
car is repeated twice), we added a further condition where the
experimenter stretched her arm toward the empty place where the
car was located in the demonstration condition (Motor resonance
condition). The experimenter then performed the demonstration
as in the Classic demonstration condition, followed by the
test.
We compared infants’ scores for the first action at the test, the
best action and the mean score for all actions. We found that
there was a significant effect of condition, due to the difference
between the prior intention group and all other groups. Infants
used the rake in connection with the toy significantly more often
after watching the experimenter showing her intention prior
to demonstration than after a classic demonstration. And this
effect is unlikely to be due to stimulus enhancement or to motor
resonance (see Figure 5).
This result suggests that one of the reasons infants do not learn
from observing a demonstration of unfamiliar tool use is that they
do not understand the intention of the experimenter when he or
she does the classic demonstration. This is consistent either with
the teleological reasoning theory suggesting that infants need
to understand the intended goal of the experimenter in order
to understand her actions and selectively imitate them (Gergely
and Csibra, 2003), or with a more mentalistic view (Buttelmann
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FIGURE 5 | Mean score at the test following demonstration (except for the Spontaneous group) as a function of condition.
et al., 2008). It is in accordance with the studies showing more
successful imitation of the means when the demonstration comes
after the intention of the model is shown (Carpenter et al., 2002;
Southgate et al., 2009).
IMPLICIT REPEATED DEMONSTRATION
OF TOOL USE
Another possibility to explain why in previous studies we failed
to show observational learning may be that providing a few
demonstrations in a single session is not an effective way to learn.
In real life, infants have ample opportunity over many months to
observe adults around them using tools. For example, as already
mentioned, infants start understanding the affordance of a spoon
after many opportunities to watch the functionality of the spoon
when seeing people around them eat with a spoon. In addition,
parents’ or caregivers’ demonstrations are implicit rather than
explicit as in the demonstrations used in our studies. Parents
rarely tell their children “look how I hold my spoon to eat”!
We decided to investigate what would happen if infants had a
similar opportunity, over an extended period of time, to watch
an adult repeatedly use a rake to move objects. We opposed this
condition with a condition where infants had the opportunity to
manipulate a tool in the presence of toys, all within reach, without
any demonstration from the adults. Thus we contrasted the effect
of implicit repeated demonstration without practice with that of
practice manipulation without demonstration.
In this study Somogyi et al. (2015), 18 infants were followed
from the age of 14 months over 6 weeks. We used the same
rake as for the previous studies, and toy and rake were presented
with a spatial gap between them. We knew from the previous
studies that in this age range, and with a spatial gap, infants would
not spontaneously succeed. We compared the performance at
16 months depending on the kind of familiarization received
with the tool. In one group (Visual familiarization, 10 infants),
the infants observed an adult use a rake to bring a toy toward
the infant, doing so without any verbal comment so as to avoid
explicit teaching. The action was repeated eight times, each time
with a different toy. The infants were never given the rake during
this familiarization phase.
In the other group (Manual familiarization, 8 infants), the
rake was placed on the table near the infant, next to a few
toys, and the infants were allowed 5 min to freely interact with
the rake and the toys. No instruction or demonstration was
given. We decided to use this manual control group in response
to colleagues’ suggestions that perhaps infants do not learn by
observation because they are not manually familiar with the tool
and thus the action is motorically too demanding, making it
difficult for the infant to pick up the relevant information during
demonstration.
All infants came to the lab for the first session: they were
first tested on the spontaneous use of the rake as in the
condition of spatial gap described above, to confirm that they
all spontaneously failed at the task. They were then assigned to
one of the two groups. All infants of the Visual group received
Visual familiarization from the experimenter and all infants of
the Manual group received Manual familiarization as described
above. For both kinds of familiarization the parent present in the
lab was taught the procedure he or she would have to use once
a week at home with the infant for the following 5 weeks. In
addition, one of the experimenters went to visit all the families
every other week so as to check that the familiarization had been
well understood by the parent. All infants came to the lab for the
seventh session: they were first tested on the spontaneous use, and
if they failed they were given two classic demonstrations from the
experimenter followed by a test.
We observed a significant effect of test time and a significant
interaction between test time and familiarization condition,
indicating a significant effect of familiarization in the case
of Visual familiarization, but not in the case of Manual
familiarization.
We also compared the highest score obtained at the seventh
session before and after demonstration, as a function of the
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kind of familiarization. Again we found a significant interaction,
with a significant effect of familiarization in the case of Visual
familiarization, but not in the case of Manual familiarization. This
shows that infants of the Visual familiarization group increased
their performance significantly more after demonstration than
infants of the Manual familiarization group (see Figure 6).
The interesting point raised by these results is that they
show that infants can improve their performance at tool use
without manual familiarization with the tool. Repeated purely
visual demonstrations of the functionality of the tool, made in
a natural way, without explicit reference to its use, is enough to
significantly advance the age of successful tool use.
These results first show that it is not the lack of manual
skill which leads to the absence of learning from classic
demonstration. They also suggest that infants may need several
demonstrations over an extended time period to learn by
observation. Most importantly, our results suggest that implicit
demonstration in an ecological setting may be more efficient than
explicit teaching.
MAKING THE INFANT LAUGH DURING
DEMONSTRATION
Evidence from an additional study we performed suggest another,
less studied, factor influencing observational learning, namely
emotional state. In a pilot study where we were pre-testing ways
of giving the demonstration, we observed with surprise that,
when occasionally infants were amused by our demonstration
and laughed, these laughing babies would imitate us immediately
after a demonstration. They did this with a level of skill that we
had never observed after other demonstrations. We thus decided
to experimentally test the effect of laughing on the ability to learn
from a demonstration.
In this study (Esseily et al., 2015), we tested 51 18-month-
old infants. We chose this age because it is the youngest age
when classic demonstration of tool use starts to be effective. We
eliminated 11 infants who succeeded spontaneously at the first
tool-use test given before the demonstrations started. We used
the same rake as for the previous studies and toy and rake were
presented with a spatial gap between them. Among the 40 infants
who failed spontaneously at the first test and thus were kept in the
study, 10 infants received a classic demonstration, and the other
30 infants received a humorous demonstration. In the humorous
demonstration, the experimenter took the rake with one hand,
used it to bring the toy closer, then reached for the toy with the
other hand and threw it onto the floor immediately. Since only
one third of the infants laughed after such a demonstration, we
ended up with three groups, Classic demonstration group (10
infants), Humorous demonstration/infants not laughing group
(20 infants), Humorous demonstration/infants laughing group
(10 infants). In all three groups the infants were tested before and
after eight demonstrations, which varied according to the group
the infant was assigned to.
Our results showed that the percentage of infants who
successfully retrieved the toy using the tool is 30% in
the Classic demonstration group, 20% in the Humorous
demonstration/infants not laughing group, and 100% in the
Humorous demonstration/infants laughing group, with these
differences being statistically significant. The 30% success in
the Classic demonstration group is close to the value found at
18 months in the spatial gap condition in Rat-Fischer et al.’s
(2012) cross-sectional study. Interestingly, the laughing infants
did not completely mimic the experimenter since only three of
them threw the toy on the floor after retrieving it. All seven others
kept the toy to play with. Thus, what was impressive is the way all
laughing infants were able to make use of the demonstration to
understand the usefulness of the tool in bringing the toy closer
(see Figure 7).
Note that to be sure that success was due to the effect of
laughing, and not due to differences in attention between the two
groups, we checked and confirmed that the non-laughing infants
looked at the experimenter during demonstrations as much as the
laughing infants.
Two interpretations seem possible to explain these results.
A first interpretation could be that the infants who were able to
appreciate humor were more advanced in their social referencing
or cognitive abilities. However, a suggestion that this is not
correct comes from our observation that even the gazes of non-
laughing infants were directed at the experimenter after she threw
the toy on the floor, indicating that even non-laughing infants
perceived the incongruity of the situation though it did not
make them laugh. Nevertheless, a possible difference in social
skills between laughing and non-laughing infants still needs to
be explored. The second hypothesis is that of the role of positive
emotions on learning, for example through endorphin release,
known to facilitate cognitive flexibility (Ashby et al., 1999). This
would fit with the observation we made in another study, showing
that when infants are put in a positive emotional state, for
instance when the experimenter mimics the infant’s action before
the tool-use task, infants achieve higher level of success than
when the test follows a more neutral pre-session (Somogyi and
Esseily, 2014).
DISCUSSION
The goal of this article was to explore observational learning
as a mechanism for learning tool use in the second year of
life. We reviewed four published studies from our laboratory
in which the demonstration was varied. In these studies
there were four different conditions of demonstration: classic;
showing intention prior to demonstration; repeated implicit
demonstrations; and humorous demonstration. In addition, in
the implicit demonstration study we opposed the benefit of
implicit observational learning to that of manual familiarization
without demonstration. The infants were tested at 16–18-months
of age. In this age range, most infants who had not been first
familiarized with the tool failed at the task (Rat-Fischer et al.,
2012; Fagard et al., 2014).
When the demonstration was classic, i.e., when an adult
explicitly showed the infant how to use the tool to retrieve
the toy, there was no benefit from the demonstration at
16 months. Demonstration led to some successes starting at
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FIGURE 6 | Mean score before and after familiarization as a function of time and condition of familiarization (∗∗∗ p < 0.0001).
FIGURE 7 | Mean percentage of success as a function of group.
18 months of age. This is late, compared with the success
of 12- to 15-month-olds at other means-end tasks following
demonstration (Provasi et al., 2001; Buttelmann et al., 2008;
Esseily et al., 2010).
When the demonstration was preceded by a gesture toward
the toy (Prior intention), thus indicating to the infant that
the experimenter wanted to get the toy but could not grasp
it directly, the effectiveness of a demonstration significantly
increased: infants tried harder to retrieve the toy with the
tool, even if they often did not fully succeed. Understanding
the intention of an agent emerges around the first year
of life (Bellagamba and Tomasello, 1999), especially when
social cues are given (Carpenter et al., 1998). Our results
are in line with studies showing that infants succeed more
after demonstration if they have been informed about the
experimenter’s intention (Carpenter et al., 2002; Southgate et al.,
2009).
We then investigated whether the number of demonstrations
could be an issue. We wanted to simulate a situation comparable
to that of the spoon, where over an extended period of time,
infants have many opportunities to watch people around them
use a spoon, but without this observation being an explicit
teaching situation. Thus in our experiment parents pushed the
toys toward the infants using the tool, and did this without
commenting, as if it was a natural thing to push a toy toward
the infant using a rake (Implicit repeated demonstrations).
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In the same study, we contrasted this implicit visual training
(the infants never had the opportunity to touch the tool) with
a condition of manual familiarization without demonstration.
The results showed a significantly greater benefit from visual
familiarization compared to manual familiarization. In the test
session not only did the Visual familiarization infants succeed
spontaneously more often than the Manual familiarization
infants, but among those infants who failed spontaneously,
only those in the Visual familiarization group succeeded after
demonstration.
Results from this third experiment show that 16-month-
old infants rely more on observation than on their own
motor experience when learning a new task that is relatively
complex for their age. This conclusion extends the results of
earlier studies involving older age groups (Hopper et al., 2010;
Whiten and Flynn, 2010; Beck et al., 2011). This does not
mean that manipulation is unimportant. Instead it is likely that
observational learning and manipulation play a different role
depending on the stage of learning. In our tool-use task, there
are two factors of difficulty: first children must understand the
affordance of the rake; once they know that they can use the
rake to retrieve the toy, they must learn how to manipulate
it in order to succeed. It was clear in our observations of the
first behaviors of the children that they did not understand
the affordance of the rake: they discarded it, or played with
it after begging for the toy and without pointing the rake
toward the toy. Once they tried to use the rake to retrieve
the toy, the first such trials were unsuccessful because they did
not know very well how to manipulate the rake, but success
came rather quickly and within the same session. Observational
learning seems more efficient than manipulation for discovering
a complex affordance such as for an unfamiliar tool to retrieve an
out-of-reach object, which requires bridging the gap between tool
and toy before pulling back the toy with the tool. In turn, practice
is important for refining the manual skill allowing the task to be
done.
In the last study we checked the effect of laughing
on observational learning (Humorous demonstration). We
compared the effect of a classic demonstration with that of
a humorous demonstration where the experimenter threw the
toy on the floor after retrieving it with the tool. Only one
third of the infants laughed, but 100% of the laughing infants
fully succeeded after the demonstration, whereas there was
a significantly lower percentage of success among the non-
laughing infants and the infants in the classic demonstration
condition. One important finding was that laughing infants’
success did not involve systematic mimicry of the adult’s action:
the laughing infants clearly learned the affordance of the tool
rather than a specific action of throwing the toy on the
floor.
To summarize, this series of studies suggests that there might
be several reasons why infants younger than 18 months do
not learn to use a tool from a classic demonstration. First, not
understanding the goal of the demonstrator may keep them from
making sense of what they observe. Second, two demonstrations
may not be enough to learn a complex affordance such as that
of a tool: repeated demonstrations over an extended time period
(weeks) may be necessary. Third, explicit teaching may not be the
best way to help infants learn how to use a new tool. Fourth, an
unexpected outcome leading to a shared positive emotional state
is extremely effective in favoring learning from a demonstration.
Another important conclusion from these studies is that, at least
in the case of the rake, whose affordances may not be known to
a child under 2 years of age, observational learning may be more
important than manual practice in discovering new functions.
These findings share common interpretations with the studies
on the factors influencing infants’ abilities to imitate mentioned
in the introduction (opacity of the means, of the goal, of
the model’s intention, irrationality of the means, etc.). Two
interpretations can be proposed to explain them. One is that there
is a cognitive load in understanding the demonstration of the
model: the infant may not know what to attend to, what part of
the action is important for success, when to pay attention, what
is the affordance of the rake, etc. When the infant is shown the
model’s intention before demonstration, when the goal is made
clearer, when more demonstrations are provided, then the child
better understands the affordance of the rake and how he or she
should proceed to act like the model. Another, non-exclusive,
interpretation is that learning is always based on social cues and
interactions: not knowing how to reach a goal may be stressful
for the young child, just as it is for adults, and the social cues
given to the learner, and more generally the social context of the
demonstration, may make a huge difference in the efficacy of the
modeling of the action; this might explain why when there is no
implicit pressure (such as “do like me”), or when the unexpected
outcome puts the child in a positive emotional state, children are
more likely to understand the means used by the model to retrieve
the toy.
In conclusion, observational learning of complex new tasks
in young children (as opposed to imitation of simpler tasks) is
a somewhat neglected topic in developmental psychology. This
review of studies we have done in our laboratory suggests that
observational learning may be an important factor to consider
in understanding the acquisition of tool use, in addition to
more traditionally studied factors such as perceptual constraints,
exploration and trial and error. Our review suggests that further
work on observational learning should profitably include work on
how a child interprets a demonstrator’s intentions, and on how
implicit observation of non-teaching situations over extended
time influences learning. Such studies may have pedagogical
implications as concerns teaching new skills to very young
infants.
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